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date: 20 April 2024

legal positivism, 

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
John FinnisJohn Finnis

intending to oppose natural law theory, denies any ‘necessary connexion between law and morality’. Central theses among a loose cluster: (1) law is definable and explainable without evaluative predicates or presuppositions; (2) the law (e.g. of England now) is identifiable from exclusively factual sources (e.g. legislation, judicial precedents). Some versions deny that there is knowable moral truth. Most understand positive law as products of will, some as imperatives.... ...

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