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date: 13 September 2024

defeasibility 

Source:
A Dictionary of Ethics
Author(s):

Terence Cuneo

A moral principle, say, that intentionally causing pain is morally wrong, is defeasible if it allows that someone could cause pain but not act wrongly. There are several explanations as to why such a principle might be defeasible. There may be situations in which causing pain fails to count morally against an action at all, such as when causing pain to another is necessary in order to save her life. Or there may be situations in which causing pain counts morally against an action but is outweighed by other moral considerations, such as when causing pain is morally problematic but is necessary to instill a moral virtue such as courage. Philosophers mark the defeasible status of moral principles by using terms such as ... ...

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